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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
U.S. Supreme Court Holds that the New York Convention Does Not Displace Domestic Doctrines
Permitting Nonsignatories to Enforce Arbitration Agreements
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.78
On June 1, 2020, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention or
Convention) does not conflict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines that permit the
enforcement of arbitration agreements by nonsignatories. The Court interpreted the text
of the Convention as being silent on the issue of enforcement by nonsignatories and thus
leaving this issue to domestic law. The Court noted that some postratification practice
(including the recommendation of a UN commission) and the views of the executive branch
were consistent with its conclusion, but it did not determine how much weight should be
accorded to these sources.
In 2007, two companies entered into three contracts whereby one would provide the other
with certain steel manufacturing equipment.1 All three contracts between the supplier and the
purchaser included arbitration clauses stating: “‘[a]ll disputes arising between both parties in con-
nection with or in the performances of the Contract[s] . . . shall be submitted to arbitration for
settlement.’”2 The contracts further provided that this arbitration would take place in Germany.3
After the formation of these contracts, the supplier subcontracted with GE Energy Power
Conversion France SAS, Corp. (GE Energy) for the “design, manufacture, and supply” of the
motors for this equipment.4 In 2016, the purchaser’s successor company, Outokumpo
Stainless USA, LLC, sued GE Energy in Alabama state court, alleging that GE Energy’s
motors had failed and resulted in substantial damages.5 After removing the case to federal
court, GE Energy filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, invoking the arbitration
clauses that were in the original three contracts.6
The federal district court granted this motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed. It concluded that the original three contracts were sufficiently
transnational in nature that their arbitration provisions could fall within the ambit of the
New York Convention7—an international agreement that, while mostly focused on the rec-
ognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, also includes an article imposing certain obliga-
tions on states with respect to the recognition and enforcement of written arbitration
agreements.8 The Eleventh Circuit further found, however, that the arbitration provisions
1 GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1642
(2020).
2 Id. (quoting the contracts) (first alteration in original).
3 Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC v. Converteam SAS, 902 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).
4 GE Energy Power, supra note 1, at 1642.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Outokumpu Stainless, supra note 3, at 1324–25 (reaching this finding in establishing subject matter
jurisdiction).
8 The United States ratified the New York Convention on September 30, 1970, and the Convention entered
into force on December 29, 1970. See UN Commission on International Trade Law, Status: Convention on the
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in the original three contracts did not give GE Energy a right to arbitration. In reaching this
conclusion, it observed, as a subcontractor, GE Energy was “undeniably not a signatory to the
[c]ontracts” and stated that the New York Convention “require[s] that the parties actually
sign an agreement to arbitrate their disputes in order to compel arbitration.”9 In essence,
the Eleventh Circuit read theNew York Convention as prohibiting GEEnergy from invoking
domestic equitable estoppel principles that might otherwise have provided it with a pathway
to enforcing the arbitration provision despite its status as a nonsignatory.10
On June 1, 2020, the SupremeCourt unanimously reversed the EleventhCircuit. In an opin-
ion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the New York Convention does not con-
flict with domestic equitable estoppel doctrines allowing for the enforcement of arbitration by
nonsignatories.11 The Court reached this conclusion by using “familiar tools of treaty interpre-
tation,” first considering the text of the treaty and then turning to other interpretive aids.12
With respect to text, the Court concluded that the language of the New York Convention
was silent on the issue of enforcement by nonsignatories. Article II of the New York
Convention provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the par-
ties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbi-
trationagreement, signedby thepartiesor contained inanexchangeof lettersor telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of
which the parties havemade an agreement within themeaning of this article, shall, at
the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that
the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.13
The Court read this language as meant only to “provide[] that arbitration agreements must be
enforced in certain circumstances” but “not [to] prevent the application of domestic laws that
are more generous in enforcing arbitration agreements.”14 The Court stated:
The text of the New York Convention does not address whether nonsignatories may
enforce arbitration agreements under domestic doctrines such as equitable estoppel.
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), at https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/
arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2.
9 Outokumpu Stainless, supra note 3, at 1326.
10 See id. at 1326–37. Domestic equitable estoppel principles “allow[] a nonsignatory to a written agreement
containing an arbitration clause to compel arbitration where a signatory to the written agreement must rely on the
terms of that agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.” GE Energy Power, supra note 1, at 1644
(quoting RICHARD LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:19 (4th ed. 2001)).
11 GE Energy Power, supra note 1, at 1648.
12 Id. at 1644–45. The Court invoked its prior case law in identifying these tools and did not cite to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties at any point in its analysis. See id. at 1645–48.
13 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Art. II, June 10, 1958, 21
UST 2517, 330 UNTS 38.
14 GE Energy Power, supra note 1, at 1645.
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The Convention is simply silent on the issue of nonsignatory enforcement, and in
general, “a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered”—a principle “so obvious
that it seems absurd to recite it.”15
The Court further observed that, “[g]iven that the Convention was drafted against the
backdrop of domestic law, it would be unnatural to read Article II(3) to displace domestic
doctrines in the absence of exclusionary language.”16
After discussing the Convention’s text, the Supreme Court looked to the “negotiation and
drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory
nations” as “aids to its interpretation.”17 As to the drafting history, the Court concluded
that “[n]othing in [it] suggests that the Convention sought to prevent contracting states
from applying domestic law that permits nonsignatories to enforce arbitration agreements
in additional circumstances.”18
As to the postratification understanding, the Court observed that the “courts of numerous
contracting states permit enforcement of arbitration agreements by entities who did not sign
an agreement” and noted that at least one state—Peru—has legislation to this effect as well.19
The Court also observed that “GE Energy points to a recommendation issued by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law that, although not directly addressing
Article II(3), adopts a nonexclusive interpretation of Article II(1) and (2).”20 In reference
to these sources, the Court stated:
These sources, while generally pointing in one direction, are not without their faults.
The court decisions, domestic legislation, and UN recommendation relied on by the
parties occurred decades after the finalization of the New York Convention’s text in
1958. This diminishes the value of these sources as evidence of the original shared
understanding of the treaty’s meaning. Moreover, unlike the actions and decisions
of signatory nations, we have not previously relied on UN recommendations to discern
the meaning of treaties.
The Court nonetheless concluded that “to the extent this evidence is given any weight, it
confirms our interpretation of the Convention’s text.”21
Finally, the Supreme Court considered the views of the executive branch but declined to
decide whether to give deference to these views. In an amicus brief, the executive branch had
supported GE Energy’s position and claimed that, as “the Branch constitutionally responsible
for negotiating and enforcing treaties,” the executive’s interpretation was “‘entitled to great
weight.’”22 The Court stated:
15 Id. (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93
(2012)).
16 Id. (citation omitted).
17 Id. at 1646 (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008)).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1647.
21 Id. (citation omitted).
22 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 30, GE Energy Power, 140 S. Ct. 1637
(No. 18-1048) (citation omitted). Cf. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 306(6) (2018) (“Courts in the United States have final authority to interpret a treaty for purposes of
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We have never provided a full explanation of the basis for our practice of giving weight to
the Executive’s interpretation of a treaty. Nor have we delineated the limitations of this
practice, if any. But we need not resolve these issues today. Our textual analysis aligns
with the Executive’s interpretation so there is no need to determine whether the
Executive’s understanding is entitled to “weight” or “deference.”23
After concluding that the New York Convention did not prohibit GE Energy from enforc-
ing the arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the lower court to
address whether “GE Energy could enforce the arbitration clauses under principles of equi-
table estoppel or which body of law governs that determination.”24
STATE JURISDICTION AND IMMUNITY
U.S. Supreme Court Rules that Victims of State-Sponsored Terrorism Can Sue Foreign States for
Retroactive Punitive Damages Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.75
In Opati v. Republic of Sudan, the Supreme Court upheld a $4.3 billion award of punitive
damages against Sudan for its support of the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. The Supreme Court held that Congress’s 2008 amendments to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) authorized the plaintiffs to recover punitive damages
from state sponsors of terrorism for acts committed prior to the enactment of these amend-
ments. This case is part of a broader trend of U.S. litigation brought against states who are
designated sponsors of terrorism or alternatively are deemed responsible for acts of terrorism
within the United States.
Following the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, victims and fam-
ily members sued Sudan for its alleged facilitation of these attacks.1 At the time, Sudan had
already been designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism.2
Plaintiffs were therefore able to sue Sudan for money damages, as an exception added in
1996 to the FSIA withheld immunity from state sponsors of terrorism in cases alleging
their responsibility for the death or personal injury of U.S. citizens through acts like
applying it as law in the United States. In doing so, they ordinarily give great weight to an interpretation by the
executive branch.”).
23 GE Energy Power, supra note 1, at 1647 (citation omitted).
24 Id. at 1648. Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, noting: “I agree with the Court that the
[New York Convention] does not categorically prohibit the application of domestic doctrines, such as equitable
estoppel, thatmay permit nonsignatories to enforce arbitration agreements. I note, however, that the application of
such domestic doctrines is subject to an important limitation: Any applicable domestic doctrines must be rooted in
the principle of consent to arbitrate.” Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
1 Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601, 1604 (2020).
2 TheU.S. State Department designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism on August 12, 1993. 58 Fed. Reg.
52,397, 52,523 (1993). The State Department still maintains this designation. U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release,
State Sponsors of Terrorism, at https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism [https://perma.cc/3AMY-
BB7V]. Recently, Sudan has sought to have this designation removed. Hilary Mossberg & John Prendergast,
Sudan’s Push for Removal from U.S. Terror List: Not a Panacea, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 29, 2020), at https://www.
justsecurity.org/68275/sudans-push-for-removal-from-u-s-terror-list-not-a-panacea.
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extrajudicial killings.3 This exception to immunity came with the limitation that punitive
damages could not be awarded against the state sponsor of terrorism.4
In 2008, Congress again amended the FSIA to, among other things, allow plaintiffs suing
under the state sponsor of terrorism exception to recover punitive damages. The amendments
also created a new federal cause of action for such cases; mandated that existing lawsuits filed
under this exception be treated “as if” they had been filed under the 2008 amended FSIA; and
enabled “plaintiffs to file new actions ‘arising out of the same act or incident’ as an earlier
action and claim the benefits of [the amended terrorism exception].”5 Congress placed
many of these changes in a new statutory provision—28 U.S.C. § 1605A.6
As a result of these changes, the plaintiffs in the suit against Sudan “amended their complaint
to include the new federal cause of action, and hundreds of additional victims and family mem-
bers filed new claims.”7 Sudan declined to participate in the consolidated bench trial, and the
district court entered a default judgment for the plaintiffs.8With the help of seven special masters
in the determination of damages, the court awarded the plaintiffs around $10.2 billion in dam-
ages, of which around $4.3 billion were punitive damages.9 Sudan later made an appearance and
appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit.10 Although the D.C. Circuit upheld the district
court’s determination of Sudan’s liability, it vacated the award of punitive damages on the ground
that Congress had not been sufficiently clear in providing that punitive damages would be ret-
roactively available for cases grounded in pre-2008 conduct.11 The plaintiffs subsequently filed a
petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted to address whether punitive
damages were available retroactively in light of the 2008 amendments to the FSIA.12
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the 2008 amendments to the FSIA provided
for the retroactive award of punitive damages.13 In an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Court
3 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1605 to withhold immunity from designated state sponsors of terrorism in cases brought
for money damages by U.S. citizen plaintiffs or regarding U.S. citizen victims alleging personal injury or death that
the state caused “by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources . . . for such an act”). Unless the FSIA sets forth an exception to immunity, foreign
states are “immune from the jurisdiction” of U.S. courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (providing that foreign states denied immunity under § 1605 or § 1607 are not liable for
punitive damages).
5 Opati, supra note 1, at 1606; see generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110–181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338 (2008) (containing these changes, as well as specifying that
such suits could be brought not only with respect to U.S. citizen plaintiffs, but also with respect to plaintiffs
who, regardless of citizenship, were affected while working as U.S. governmental employees or contractors).
6 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
7 Opati, supra note 1, at 1606.
8 See id.
9 See id. at 1607.
10 Id.
11 Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 816–18, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. Opati
v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601 (2020).
12 Opati, supra note 1, at 1606; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Opati, 140 S. Ct. 1601 (2020) (No. 17–
1268). The Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief in support of the petition for certiorari in which it
asserted that the D.C. Circuit erred in vacating the award of punitive damages. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 10,Opati, 140 S. Ct. 1601 (2020) (No. 17–1268). TheDOJ contended that the 2008 amended
FSIA does hold foreign states liable for punitive damages for actions committed prior to the 2008 amendments. Id.
at 16.
13 Opati, supra note 1, at 1608–09.
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concluded that Congress made this clear because it both “(1) . . . authorized punitive damages
under a new cause of action; and (2) . . . explicitly made that new cause of action available to
remedy certain past acts of terrorism.”14 The Court rejected Sudan’s argument that Congress
should be required to provide a “super-clear statement” for the authorization of retroactive
punitive damages.15 While the Court stated that it did not “doubt that applying new pun-
ishments to completed conduct can raise serious constitutional questions,” it advised litigants
to “challenge the law’s constitutionality, not ask a court to ignore the law’s manifest direc-
tion.”16 The Supreme Court therefore vacated the D.C. Circuit’s decision to the extent
that it had stricken the award for punitive damages.17 Despite this favorable ruling, the plain-
tiffs could still face obstacles in enforcing the judgment against Sudan—a pervasive problem
in such cases.18
In its opinion, the Supreme Court grounded the U.S. law of sovereign immunity in con-
siderations of international comity:
The starting point for nearly any dispute touching on foreign sovereign immunity lies in
Schooner Exchange v. MacFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 3 S.Ct. 287 (1812). There, Chief
Justice Marshall explained that foreign sovereigns do not enjoy an inherent right to be
held immune from suit in American courts: “The jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself.”19
The Court also cited a more recent decision from 2004 for the proposition that “foreign sov-
ereign immunity is a matter of ‘grace and comity.’”20 This understanding of sovereign immu-
nity is potentially at odds with the view that foreign sovereign immunity is, at least under
certain conditions, required as a matter of customary international law.21
TheOpati decision is one of many recent cases in the United States in which plaintiffs have
been awarded punitive damages against state sponsors of terrorism.22 As inOpati, these deci-
sions have often been rendered in the district courts as default judgments, owing to the failure
of foreign state defendants to appear in court.23 Overall, courts have awarded plaintiffs
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1609.
16 Id. at 1609–10.
17 Id. at 1610.
18 E. Perot V. Bissell & Joseph R. Schottenfeld, Exceptional Judgments: Revising the Terrorism Exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 127 YALE L.J. 1890, 1899 (2018) (noting that punitive damages “regularly go
unrecovered” in FSIA suits).
19 Opati, supra note 1, at 1605 (quoting The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812)).
20 Id. (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 514 U.S. 677, 689 (2004)).
21 See Jasper Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity, or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 854–56, 870–
71 (2011) (discussing various courts’ understanding of sovereign immunity); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of
the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 ICJ Rep. 99, para. 78 (Feb. 3) (“[T]he Court considers
that customary international law continues to require that a State be accorded immunity in proceedings for torts
allegedly committed on the territory of another State by its armed forces and other organs of State in the course of
conducting an armed conflict.”).
22 Bissell & Schottenfeld, supra note 18, at 1890–92 (discussing suits brought against Cuba and Iran under the
terrorism exception of the FSIA).
23 Id.
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substantial punitive damages against foreign states, with the awards collectively reaching
many billions of dollars.24
Litigation in the United States against foreign states for their alleged involvement in acts
that harm Americans is likely to continue increasing. In 2016, Congress overrode President
Obama’s veto to enact the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). Codified
largely in 28 U.S.C. § 1605B, the JASTA creates a new statutory exception to state immunity
related to terrorism.25 Section 1605B removes immunity from states, including ones that
have not been designated by the State Department as sponsors of terrorism, with respect to
suits alleging:
[p]hysical injury to person or property or death occurring in the United States and caused
by—(1) an act of international terrorism in the United States; and (2) a tortious act or
acts of the foreign state [or its officials] . . . regardless where the tortious act or acts of the
foreign state occurred.26
Congress provided that the JASTA applies to “any civil action—(1) pending on, or com-
menced on or after, the date of [its] enactment . . .; and (2) arising out of an injury to a
person, property, or business on or after September 11, 2001.”27 While the JASTA does
not itself provide a cause of action or specify the availability of punitive damages, it
opens the door to lawsuits grounded in other federal or state laws, including ones
that allow for punitive or treble damages. It might prove difficult in light of Opati for
foreign states to raise retroactivity challenges in such cases with respect to the award of
such damages.28
The string of litigation against foreign states has continued even amid the coronavirus pan-
demic. Contending that China was responsible for the spread of the coronavirus, numerous
actors have brought lawsuits against China for its alleged “malfeasance, misfeasance, and/or
nonfeasance,” which, the plaintiffs contend, “caused the pandemic.”29 The plaintiffs invoke
24 Id. For critiques of these awards, see id. at 1899–909 (arguing that large punitive damages run counter toU.S.
policy interests); Haim Abraham, Awarding Punitive Damages Against Foreign States Is Dangerous and
Counterproductive, LAWFARE (Mar. 1, 2019), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/awarding-punitive-damages-
against-foreign-states-dangerous-and-counterproductive (arguing that large punitive damages imposed against
foreign states make it difficult for plaintiffs to enforce compensatory awards and threaten “the peaceful interna-
tional order”).
25 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) [hereinafter JASTA];
Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Congress Votes to Override Obama Veto on 9/11
Victims Bill, N.Y. Times (Sept. 28, 2016), at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-
to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11-victims-bill.html.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b).
27 JASTA, supra note 25, § 7, 130 Stat. at 855. In a case involving Saudi Arabia, plaintiffs sued the country for its
involvement in the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 under the JASTA. Ashton v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army (In
re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), 298 F. Supp. 3d 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The federal district court
held that the JASTA “provides courts with new legal principles to apply, retroactively and prospectively, in deter-
mining claims for sovereign immunity.” Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
28 See Opati, supra note 1, at 1610 (advising the D.C. Circuit to reconsider its holding that punitive damages
were not retroactively available following the 2008 FSIA amendments with respect to the plaintiffs’ separate state
law claims); Haley S. Anderson, The Significance of the Supreme Court’s Opati Decision for States and Companies
Sued for Terrorism in U.S. Courts, JUST SECURITY (May 19, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/70260/the-sig-
nificance-of-the-supreme-courts-opati-decision-for-states-and-companies-sued-for-terrorism-in-u-s-courts.
29 E.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, Alters v. People’s Republic of China, No. 120–2110 (S.D.
Fla. May 4, 2020).
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various exceptions to immunity set forth in the FSIA, including Section 1605B.30 Aside from
these efforts to hold China accountable under existing exceptions in the FSIA, some legisla-
tors have signaled their interest in amending the FSIA to strip China of sovereign immunity
relating to its handling of the coronavirus pandemic.31 In fact, two legislators, Representative
Dan Crenshaw and Senator TomCotton, have already introduced bills that would amend the
FSIA to include a proposed Section 1605C, allowing foreign states to be sued for spreading
COVID-19 and tortious acts relating to the concealment of the existence of COVID-19.32
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Trump Administration Submits Notice of U.S. Withdrawal from theWorld Health Organization
Amid COVID-19 Pandemic
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.76
President Trump decided in mid-April of 2020 to suspend U.S. funding for the World
Health Organization (WHO) and to have his administration review its performance, con-
tending that it was biased in favor of China and inept in its handling of the COVID-19
pandemic. In a letter to theWHOdirector-general a month later, Trump informed the direc-
tor-general that his administration’s review confirmed his accusations. He threatened that,
unless the WHO implemented significant reforms, the United States would reconsider its
membership in the organization. Less than two weeks later, on May 29, 2020, Trump
announced his decision to terminate the U.S. relationship with the WHO. On July 6, the
administration gave formal notice of U.S. withdrawal to theUN secretary-general, the deposi-
tary for the WHO Constitution. Assuming certain legal preconditions are satisfied and the
notice of withdrawal is not revoked, the withdrawal will take effect on July 6, 2021.
30 Id. at 11–14 (invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (commercial activity exception); § 1605(a)(5) (exception for
personal injury or death or property damage occurring within the United States caused by certain tortious activity
of the foreign state or its officials); § 1605B (the JASTA’s exception)); see also First Amended Class Action
Complaint at 22, Bella Vista LLC v. People’s Republic of China, No. 220–0574 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2020)
(invoking these same provisions); Class Action Complaint at 3, Buzz Photos v. People’s Republic of China,
No. 320–0656 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2020) (asserting the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under “the
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”) exception” and separately invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1605);
Class Action Complaint at 10, Benitez-White v. People’s Republic of China, No. 420–1562 (S.D. Tex. May
3, 2020) (maintaining that China is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the JASTA).
31 Sean Mirski, Senate Judiciary Committee Examines the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Coronavirus-
Related Suits Against China, LAWFARE (June 30, 2020), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/senate-judiciary-commit-
tee-examines-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act-and-coronavirus-related-suits; Comm. on the Judiciary, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Coronavirus, and Addressing China’s Culpability (June 23, 2020), at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act-coronavirus-and-addressing-
chinas-culpability.
32 Holding the Chinese Communist Party Accountable for Infecting Americans Act of 2020, S. 3662, 116th
Cong. § 4 (2020); Holding the Chinese Community Party Accountable for Infecting Americans Act of 2020,
H.R. 6519, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020).
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The WHO was established on April 7, 1948, when the WHO Constitution entered into
force.1 Because the WHO Constitution does not provide for withdrawal,2 when the United
States sought membership in the WHO, the House and the Senate stipulated in a joint res-
olution authorizing U.S. membership that:
In adopting this joint resolution the Congress does so with the understanding that, in the
absence of any provision in theWorld Health Organization Constitution for withdrawal
from the Organization, the United States reserves its right to withdraw from the
Organization on a one-year notice: Provided, however, That the financial obligations of
the United States to the Organization shall be met in full for the Organization’s current
fiscal year.3
President Truman made explicit that he was “acting pursuant to the authority granted by
the joint resolution of the Congress . . . and subject to the provisions of that joint
resolution” when he submitted the instrument of U.S. acceptance to the WHO
Constitution.4 A copy of the joint resolution was enclosed with this instrument of accep-
tance.5 At the First World Health Assembly on July 2, 1948, the Assembly unanimously
adopted a resolution that “[r]ecognized the validity of the ratification of the Constitution
by the United States of America.”6 This resolution passed after a short discussion in which
the desirability of U.S. admission to the WHO was emphasized even though, as the UK rep-
resentative put it, “[t]here [was] nothing to be gained by attempting to deny that certain con-
ditions are attached to the ratification.”7
In confronting the novel coronavirus, the WHO has faced a pandemic unparalleled in the
modern era.8 Trump began criticizing theWHO’s response to the outbreak beginning in late
March of 2020, voicing concerns that the Organization had “very—very much sided with
China.”9 Trump’s criticisms of the WHO escalated in early April when he warned that he
would be “put[ting] a hold on” funding to the Organization because it had purportedly
1 United Nations Depository Status for the Constitution of theWorld Health Organization, at https://treaties.
un.org/Pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx?src¼UNTSONLINE&tabid¼2&mtdsg_no¼IX-1&chapter¼9&
lang¼en [hereinafter Depository Status for the WHO Constitution].
2 See generally Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat.
2679, 14 UNTS 185.
3 Act of June 14, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80–643, § 4, 62 Stat. 441 [hereinafter Joint Resolution AuthorizingWHO
Membership]. For more on how this provision came to be included in the joint resolution, see Jean Galbraith, The
US CannotWithdraw from theWHOWithout First Paying Its Dues, JUST SECURITY (May 26, 2020), at https://www.
justsecurity.org/70384/the-us-cannot-withdraw-from-the-who-without-first-paying-its-dues.
4 62 Stat. 2792 (1948) (reproducing Truman’s acceptance of the WHO Constitution on behalf of the United
States) [hereinafter U.S. Acceptance of the WHO Constitution].
5 62 Stat. 2792–93 (1948).
6 Id. (reproducing a communication made by the UN secretary-general to the U.S. secretary of state); see also
World Health Assembly Res. WHA1.76, para. 1 (July 2, 1948).
7 World Health Assembly, 1st Sess., 10th plen. mtg. at 77–80 (1948), available at https://apps.who.int/iris/bit-
stream/handle/10665/85592/Official_record13_eng.pdf?sequence¼1&isAllowed¼y [https://perma.cc/LXL9-
Y83J].
8 Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Opening Remarks at the Member State
Briefing on the COVID-19 Pandemic Evaluation (July 9, 2020), at https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/
who-director-general-opening-remarks-at-the-member-state-briefing-on-the-covid-19-pandemic-evaluation—9-
july-2020 (calling the coronavirus pandemic an “unprecedented threat”).
9 Remarks at a White House Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 190, at 11
(Mar. 25).
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mishandled the coronavirus outbreak.10 He criticized the WHO for not declaring the coro-
navirus outbreak a pandemic sooner,11 “minimiz[ing] the threat very strongly,”12 announc-
ing in January that the virus could not be transmitted between humans,13 and criticizing his
decision to restrict travel from China.14 On April 14, Trump announced that he was
“instructing my administration to halt funding of the World Health Organization while a
review is conducted to assess [its] role in severely mismanaging and covering up the
spread of the coronavirus.”15 His response immediately drew criticism from foreign
leaders.16 Closer to home, leading congressional Democrats described Trump’s decision as
an “‘abdication of international responsibility and leadership’” and an attempt to deflect
attention from how the “‘White House . . . grossly mishandled this crisis from the beginning,
ignoring multiple warnings and squandering valuable time, dismissing medical science, [and]
comparing COVID-19 to the common cold.’”17
On the first day of the Seventy-third World Health Assembly held virtually on May 18,
Trump sent a four-page letter to the WHO director-general.18 In the letter, Trump
10 Remarks at a White House Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 247, at 4
(Apr. 7).
11 Id. (“[The WHO] really—they missed the call. They could have called it months earlier. They would have
known, and they should have known.”).
12 Remarks at a White House Coronavirus Task Force Press Briefing, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 250, at 5
(Apr. 8).
13 Id.
14 Id. For an analysis of the validity of Trump’s criticisms at the April 8 briefing, see Aaron Blake, Trump vs. the
WHO: Breaking Down the President’s Claims and the WHO’s Actions, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2020), at https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/09/trump-vs-who (noting, for example, that the WHO had not
announced in January that the virus could not be transmitted between humans, but rather stated only that
Chinese investigations had “‘found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission’”).
15 The President’s New Conference, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 266, at 1 (Apr. 14); see alsoWhite House
Press Release, President Donald J. Trump Is Demanding Accountability from the World Health Organization
(Apr. 15, 2020), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-demanding-
accountability-world-health-organization [https://perma.cc/G2E9-FSWL] (listing the Trump administration’s
criticisms of the WHO’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic and “structural issues and necessary reforms”).
As of July 2020, the United States has an outstanding balance of almost $58million with theWHO for the current
year. World Health Org., Assessed Contributions Overview for All Member States (July 31, 2020), at https://
www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/funding/AC_Status_Report_2020.pdf?ua¼1 [https://perma.cc/
3RTD-TCGJ]. Taking into account its outstanding balance from years prior, the United States has a total out-
standing balance of $99 million. Id. In addition, the United States has historically made even larger voluntary
contributions to the WHO—contributions which from fiscal years 2012 to 2018 averaged around $254 million
per year. LUISA BLACHFIELD & TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN11369, U.S. FUNDING TO THE
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1 (2020), at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11369 [https://
perma.cc/5PR2-4TSV].
16 Rick Noack, After Trump Suspends Payments to WHO, Other Countries Rally Behind the Agency, WASH. POST
(Apr. 15, 2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/after-trump-suspends-payments-to-who-
other-countries-rally-behind-the-agency/2020/04/15/1a2ec7c6-7f0e-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_story.
html (reporting that officials from the EU, Iran, New Zealand, and Russia criticized the decision, while
other officials reaffirmed their support for the WHO).
17 Justin Wise, Democrats Blast Trump’s Move to Suspend WHO Funding, THE HILL (Apr. 14, 2020),
at https://thehill.com/homenews/House/492839-democrats-blast-trump-move-to-suspend-who-funding
(quoting Representative Karen Bass and Senator Patrick Leahy).
18 Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, to Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir.-Gen.,
World Health Org. (May 18, 2020), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/
Tedros-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YXG-8GDT] [hereinafter U.S. Letter to the WHO]. Although Trump
was invited to speak at the Seventy-third World Health Assembly, he declined the request. Gerry Shih, Emily
Rauhala & Josh Dawsey, China’s Xi Backs WHO-Led Review of COVID-19 Outbreak, WASH. POST (May 18,
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asserted that his administration’s review of the Organization’s handling of the pandemic
“confirmed many of the serious concerns I raised last month . . . especially the World
Health Organization’s alarming lack of independence from the People’s Republic of
China.”19 The letter largely reiterated Trump’s previous criticisms of the WHO, but in
more detail.20 He also accused the WHO of ignoring early reports of the virus’s spread
in Wuhan and not investigating the situation, improperly praising China for its transpar-
ency despite irregularities in China’s reporting of information to the WHO, and issuing
“grossly inaccurate or misleading” information of the coronavirus.21 Trump concluded the
letter with an ultimatum that “if theWorld Health Organization does not commit to major
substantive improvements within the next 30 days, I will make my temporary freeze of
United States funding to the World Health Organization permanent and reconsider our
membership in the organization.”22
OnMay 29, just eleven days after sending the letter to theWHO, Trump announced that
he would be “terminating” U.S. engagement with the WHO.23 Trump stated:
We have detailed the reforms that it must make and engage with them directly, but they
have refused to act. Because they have failed to make the requested and greatly needed
reforms, we will be today terminating our relationship with the World Health
Organization and redirecting those funds to other worldwide and deserving, urgent,
global public health needs.24
Then, on July 6, the Trump administration formally submitted the U.S. notice of withdrawal
from the WHO Constitution to the UN secretary-general, the depositary for the WHO
Constitution.25 The following day, the spokesperson for the secretary-general stated:
2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-xi-backs-who-led-review-of-covid-19-out-
break-proposes-aid-for-developing-world/2020/05/18/911a1544-98df-11ea-ad79-eef7cd734641_story.html.
19 U.S. Letter to the WHO, supra note 18, at 1; but see Pien Huang, Fact-Checking and Assessing Trump’s Letter
of Rebuke to WHO, NPR (May 20, 2020), at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/05/20/
858911395/fact-checking-and-assessing-trumps-letter-of-rebuke-to-who (critiquing the accuracy of various
claims in the letter).
20 U.S. Letter to the WHO, supra note 18, at 1–4.
21 Id. at 1–3. In addition to these criticisms of theWHO’s handling of the pandemic, the Trump administration
has also condemned the Organization for excluding Taiwan from theWorld Health Assembly, accusing the direc-
tor-general of yielding to pressure from Beijing. Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State Press Release, Taiwan’s
Exclusion from the World Health Assembly (May 18, 2020), at https://www.state.gov/taiwans-exclusion-from-
the-world-health-assembly [https://perma.cc/AQ7X-5QZC].
22 U.S. Letter to the WHO, supra note 18, at 4. At the World Health Assembly, U.S. Secretary of Health and
Human Services Alex Azar leveled further criticisms against theWHO, attributing the scale of the pandemic to the
WHO’s “failure . . . to obtain the information that the world needed, and that failure cost many lives.” Plenary
Statement fromU.S. Secretary of Health andHuman Services AlexM. Azar II to theWorldHealth Assembly, at 1,
at https://apps.who.int/gb/statements/WHA73/PDF/United_States_of_America.pdf [https://perma.cc/G26H-
S6WP].
23 Remarks on United States Actions Against China, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 405, at 1 (May 29).
24 Id.
25 Stéphan Dujarric, Spokesman for the Sec’y-Gen. Press Release, Note to Correspondents in Answer to
Questions Regarding the World Health Organization (July 7, 2020), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/
note-correspondents/2020-07-07/note-correspondents-answer-questions-regarding-the-world-health-organiza-
tion [https://perma.cc/3KVN-SVS3] [hereinafter UN Acknowledgement of U.S. Notice of Withdrawal].
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[O]n 6 July 2020, the United States of America notified the Secretary-General . . . of its
withdrawal from the World Health Organization, effective on 6 July 2021.
The United States is a party to the World Health Organization Constitution since 21
June 1948. The United States’ participation in the World Health Organization was
accepted by the World Health Assembly with certain conditions set out by the US for
its eventual withdrawal from the World Health Organization. The said conditions
include giving a one-year notice and fully meeting the payment of assessed financial con-
tributions.
The Secretary-General, in his capacity as depository, is in the process of verifying with the
World Health Organization whether all the conditions for such withdrawal are met.26
In a communication to the other treaty parties on July 14, 2020, the secretary-general stated
that the withdrawal “would take effect for the United States of America on 6 July 2021 pur-
suant to the provisions of the Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States to which
the acceptance of the Constitution of the World Health Organization by the United States is
subject.”27
After the initial announcement in late May, the director-general of the WHO stated
that the Organization “wish[es] for this collaboration to continue” with the United
States.28 Other foreign leaders and health officials criticized the U.S. decision. The president
of the European Commission issued a statement urging the United States to reconsider,29 and
the health minister of South Africa labelled the decision “unfortunate.”30 The notice of with-
drawal received strong criticism domestically, with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi calling it “an
act of true senselessness” that “is crippling the international effort to defeat the virus.”31
Others have observed that the U.S. withholding of funds and withdrawal from the WHO
would severely undermine not just the Organization’s short-term initiatives addressing the
COVID-19 pandemic, but also its long-term public health initiatives around the world.32
26 Id.
27 United Nations, Depository Notification C.N.302.2020.TREATIES-IX.1 (July 14, 2020), available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2020/CN.302.2020-Eng.pdf [hereinafter Depository Notification].
28 Pien Huang,WHO’s Measured Reaction to Trump’s Pledge to Cut U.S. Ties to the Agency, NPR (June 1, 2020),
at https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/05/29/865816855/whos-muted-reaction-to-trumps-
pledge-to-withdraw-u-s-from-the-u-n-agency.
29 European Commission Press Release, STATEMENT/20/983, US Announcement on Breaking Ties with
theWorld Health Organisation: Statement by the President of the Commission Ursula Von Der Leyen and High
Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell (May 30, 2020), at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/
detail/en/STATEMENT_20_983 [https://perma.cc/5MHX-YJWW].
30 Karla Adam, Trump’s Exit from WHO Met with Dismay from Global Health Experts, WASH. POST (May 30,
2020), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trump-world-health-organization-criticism/2020/05/30/
a9650984-a26b-11ea-be06-af5514ee0385_story.html.
31 Nancy Pelosi (@SpeakerPelosi), TWITTER (July 7, 2020 5:20 PM), at https://twitter.com/SpeakerPelosi/sta-
tus/1280612714570813448; see also Coronavirus: Backlash After Trump Signals US Exit from WHO, BBC (May
30, 2020), at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52862588 (reporting that Republican Senator Lamar
Alexander and Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren both issued statements criticizing Trump’s announcement
of the termination of U.S. relations with the WHO).
32 See, e.g., Freezing World Health Organization Funding is Dangerous, 580 NATURE 431, 431 (2020) (arguing
that the loss in U.S. funding threatens the WHO’s ability to work on its more than thirty-five emergency oper-
ations around the world and other ongoing programs targeting infectious diseases); see also ElijahWolfson, Trump
Said HeWould Terminate the U.S. Relationship with the W.H.O. Here’s What That Means, TIME (June 4, 2020), at
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As a matter of international law, the United States is in a special posture relative to other
WHO member states because of the conditional right of withdrawal that it incorporated into
its original instrument of acceptance—and because of theWHOAssembly’s subsequent accep-
tance of this instrument. When the WHO Constitution entered into force in 1948, interna-
tional law was unsettled with respect to withdrawal from treaties that did not provide for
withdrawal or termination.33 In 1949, when the WHO received purported withdrawals
from the Soviet Union and various of its allies, the WHO director-general responded that
“‘because [the]Constitution ofWHOmakes no such provision [for withdrawal] I cannot accept
your communication as withdrawal from the Organization.’”34 Unlike these countries, how-
ever, the United States reserved a right of withdrawal in its original instrument of acceptance.35
While customary international law regarding the status of reservations and their acceptance was
not clearly fixed in 1948,36 the unanimous acceptance of the U.S. ratification by the WHO
Assembly provides strong legal grounds for treating this right of withdrawal as valid.37
Although the United States thus appears to have a distinctive right of withdrawal as a mat-
ter of international law, this right is bounded by the prerequisites to withdrawal stipulated in
https://time.com/5847505/trump-withdrawl-who (noting that withdrawal from the WHO not only undermines
WHO programs on “tropical disease research, HIV and hepatitis, and tuberculosis,” but would also hinder U.S.
public health researchers’ access to internally shared data among WHO members).
33 Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 634, 637–40
(Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) (noting that even in the late 1950s before the codification of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, there were various views among international law jurists on whether states
could withdraw from treaties without provisions for termination or withdrawal). The Vienna Convention later
came to provide that, where a treaty does not include a withdrawal provision, withdrawal is only available in certain
contexts, such as if “the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or a right of
denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Art. 56, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
34 EDWIN C. HOYT, THE UNANIMITY RULE IN THE REVISION OF TREATIES: A RE-EXAMINATION 70–71 (2012) (dis-
cussing this incident, including the later return of these countries to active participation in theWHO, and quoting
a communication by the director-general); see alsoCatherine M. Brölmann, Richard Collins & Ramses A. Wessel,
Exiting International Organizations: A Brief Introduction, 15 INT’L ORGS. L. REV. 243, 249 (2018) (footnote omit-
ted) (“Practice is not entirely conclusive as to the consequences of these notifications, but arguably suggests that
such withdrawal is unlawful, or in any case without legal effect”). That theWHO considered these members inac-
tive is reflected in the resolution passed at the Third World Health Assembly. World Health Assembly Res.
WHA3.84, para. 3 (May 19, 1950) (emphasis added) (“Resolves that . . . the World Health Organization will
always welcome the resumption by these Members of full co-operation in the work of the Organization . . . .”).
The United Nations depository status page for theWHOConstitution indicates that Russia joined theWHO on
March 24, 1948, rather than when the Soviet Union announced it was rejoining the Organization in July 1955.
Depository Status for the WHO Constitution, supra note 1. Similarly, the Republic of China sought withdrawal
from the WHO in May 1950, to which the Assembly resolved that “resumption by China of full participation in
the work of the Organization will be welcomed.” World Health Assembly Res. WHA3.90, paras. 1, 4 (May 25,
1950) (emphasis added). When the Republic of China rejoined the WHO, the Assembly “welcome[d] the return
of China to active participation.” World Health Assembly Res. WHA6.6, para. 1 (May 15, 1953) (emphasis
added).
35 See U.S. Acceptance of the WHO Constitution, supra note 4 (conditioning the U.S. acceptance on the
provisions set forth in Congress’s joint resolution).
36 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 UN GAOR Supp. No. 9,
at 35, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 203, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (footnotes omitted) (noting that “[t]he subject of reservations to multilateral treaties
has been much discussed in recent years and has been considered by the General Assembly itself on more than one
occasion, as well as by the International Court of Justice . . .”).
37 This process conformed with the procedure that would later be set out in the VCLT. See VCLT, supra note
33, Art. 20.3 (providing that “[w]hen a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and
unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent organ of that organization”).
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the joint resolution.38 Consistent with one of these prerequisites, the Trump administration
has given a year’s notice of the U.S. withdrawal.39 This notice could be revoked before effec-
tuated—including if Trump is not reelected in the U.S. presidential election in November of
2020.40 As to another specified prerequisite—the provision that U.S. “financial obligations . . .
shall be met in full for the Organization’s current fiscal year”41—it remains to be seen whether
or how this will be satisfied by the United States. The United States carries an outstanding
balance with theWHOof almost $58million in the current year andmore than an additional
$41 million from prior years.42
In addition to these international legal limitations, the Trump administration’s decision to
withdraw the United States from the WHO raises issues of domestic law. One issue is
whether the executive branch can unilaterally withdraw the United States from the WHO
Constitution without congressional approval. The United States joined the WHO not
through the treaty process specified in Article II of the Constitution, but rather “pursuant
to the authority granted” by the joint resolution passed by Congress.43 On rare occasions
in the past, U.S. presidents have unilaterally withdrawn the United States from international
organizations that the United States joined through such joint resolutions.44 The legality of
this practice as a matter of domestic law remains untested in the courts.
A second set of domestic legal issues stems from the conditions on withdrawal set forth in
the text of the joint resolution.45 As international legal limits on the president’s withdrawal
power, these conditions may similarly serve as domestic legal limits.46 Moreover, as a general
38 See Depository Notification, supra note 27.
39 See Joint Resolution Authorizing WHO Membership, supra note 3, § 4; UN Acknowledgement of U.S.
Notice of Withdrawal, supra note 25.
40 Revoking a notice of withdrawal before it takes legal effect is permissible under international law. See VCLT,
supra note 33, Art. 68. Joe Biden, the Democratic presidential nominee, has announced that he would return the
United States to theWHOon the first day of his presidency. Joe Biden (@JoeBiden), TWITTER (July 7, 2020, 4:44
PM), at https://twitter.com/JoeBiden/status/1280603719831359489.
41 Joint Resolution Authorizing WHO Membership, supra note 3, § 4.
42 Assessed Contributions Overview for All Member States, supra note 15; see also BRANDON J. MURRILL &
NINA M. HART, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10489, WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION:
LEGAL BASIS AND IMPLICATIONS 3 (2020), at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10489 (observ-
ing that “[i]t is unclear whether the ‘current fiscal year’ [language from in the joint resolution] refers to the fiscal
year in which the United States submits a twelve-month notice of intent to withdraw or the fiscal year in which the
twelve-month notice period expires” but that “[i]n either case . . . it would appear that the notice cannot legally take
effect until the United States pays all current obligations”).
43 U.S. Acceptance of the WHO Constitution, supra note 4.
44 Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 DUKE L.J. 1615, 1639& nn. 98, 99 (2018)
(noting that this occurred with respect to the International LaborOrganization (ILO) and twice with respect to the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)).With respect to both the ILO and
the first UNESCO withdrawal, subsequent presidents rejoined the United States to these international organiza-
tions without reobtaining congressional approval. See id.
45 Joint Resolution Authorizing WHO Membership, supra note 3, § 4. Additionally, Congress could further
challenge the withdrawal by legislating to prevent withdrawal. See A Bill to Prohibit the Use of Funds toWithdraw
the United States from the World Health Organization, S. 4240, 116th Cong. § 4 (2020) (proposing that
Congress prohibit the Trump administration from using congressional appropriated funds to withdraw from
the WHO). In the absence of a supermajority of support in both houses of Congress, however, such a bill
would be difficult to enact given the president’s veto power.
46 With respect to treaties entered into pursuant to the process set forth in Article II of the U.S. Constitution,
the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law indicates that the “established practice” of unilateral presidential
treaty withdrawal is limited to situations where this withdrawal is justified under international law. RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313 (2018); see also id., § 313 reporters’ note 5 (noting that, in contrast,
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principle of U.S. constitutional law, the president’s “power is at its lowest ebb”when “tak[ing]
measures incompatible with the . . . will of Congress.”47 Should Trump seek to effectuate the
U.S. withdrawal without fulfilling all the conditions set forth in the joint resolution, he would
be acting in violation of a congressional mandate.48
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Enters into Force
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.74
On November 30, 2018, Canada, Mexico, and the United States signed an agreement
renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). By the spring of
2020, all three countries had approved this agreement—known in the United States as the
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)1—through their respective domestic
ratification processes. The USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020, amid extended
U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada border restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On
August 6, 2020, President Trump imposed tariffs on Canadian aluminum—tariffs that his
administration had previously put in place in 2018 but had removed in 2019 in order to
smooth the USMCA’s path to ratification.
The negotiation of the USMCA took place over the first two years of the Trump admin-
istration. The agreement, signed onNovember 30, 2018, changed some of NAFTA’s key pro-
visions, including eliminating investor-state dispute settlement between the United States
and Canada and modifying the rules of origin for automobiles.2 The USMCA also added
new provisions “address[ing] intellectual property rights, rights for indigenous persons,
rules for trade negotiations with non-market countries, and the agreement’s termination.”3
“withdrawals that fail . . . to identify [a] justification under international law . . . assert an authority that the Senate
likely did not contemplate when approving the treaty”).
47 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
48 SeeMURRILL & HART, supra note 42, at 3 (observing that “the President arguably may lack the authority to
withdraw from the WHO if he does not adhere to these conditions because Congress enacted them using its con-
stitutional Spending Clause power”); cf.RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 46, § 313
reporters’ note 6 (noting that if the power to withdraw from Article II treaties is not exclusive to the president,
Congress may have the power to limit withdrawals through statutes).
1 The agreement is referred to as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the Canada-United
States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), or Tratado entreMéxico, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC), depending on
the country referring to the agreement. See Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, United States–Mexico–
Canada Trade Fact Sheet: Modernizing NAFTA into a 21st Century Trade Agreement (Oct. 2018), at https://ustr.
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/fact-sheets/modernizing
[https://perma.cc/F67G-XN5L]; Gov’t of Canada Press Release, A New Canada-United States-Mexico
Agreement (Aug. 20, 2020), at https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/index.aspx?lang¼eng [https://perma.cc/77Z8-L96P]; Gov’t of Mexico
Press Release, Textos Finales del Tratado Entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC), at https://www.
gob.mx/t-mec/acciones-y-programas/textos-finales-del-tratado-entre-mexico-estados-unidos-y-canada-t-mec-
202730?state¼published.
2 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 150, 150 (2019).
3 Id. at 155. For further discussion of the USMCA’s content, see id. at 150–59.
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW772 Vol. 114:4
The USMCA did not resolve the steel and aluminum tariffs that the Trump administration
had imposed on Canada and Mexico earlier in 2018 (or the retaliatory tariffs imposed by
Canada and Mexico). On May 17, 2019, the United States agreed with these two countries
to lift these tariffs, though providing for possible reimposition if steel or aluminum imports
“surge meaningfully beyond historic volumes of trade over a period of time.”4 These devel-
opments reportedly removed a significant political obstacle to the ratification of the USMCA.5
On June 19, 2019, Mexico became the first country to receive legislative approval for the
USMCA.6 The path in the United States was not as easy, and the U.S. House of
Representatives successfully insisted on modifications to certain USMCA provisions, includ-
ing “strengthen[ing] compliance mechanisms for the labor and environmental provisions
[and] reduc[ing] intellectual property protections for certain kinds of pharmaceuticals.”7
On December 12, Mexico’s Senate once more approved the USMCA, as renegotiated.8 On
December 19, 2019, and January 16, 2020, respectively, the U.S. House of Representatives
and Senate approved the revised USMCA through the passage of the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement Implementation Act, which Trump signed into law on January 29.9
Canada’s legislature gave its approval on March 13, 2020, just before taking an extended
pause in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.10
In April of 2020, the three countries formally notified each other that they had “completed
the internal procedures required for the entry into force” of the USMCA and its associated
4 Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, United States Announces Deal with Canada and Mexico to Lift
Retaliatory Tariffs (May 17, 2019), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/
may/united-states-announces-deal-canada-and [https://perma.cc/W9GC-BHS4]; Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.
Press Release, Joint Statement by the United States and Canada on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminum,
available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Joint_Statement_by_the_United_States_and_Canada.pdf [https://
perma.cc/237R-6HHL] (further providing that any retaliatory tariffs would occur “only in the affected sector (i.e.,
aluminum and aluminum-containing products or steel)”); Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, Joint
Statement by the United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on Steel and Aluminum, available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Joint_Statement_by_the_United_States_and_Mexico.pdf [https://perma.cc/
482V-3RY3] (including the same provision regarding retaliatory tariffs).
5 David J. Lynch, Emily Rauhala & Damian Paletta, Trump Did Something Unusual on the Trade Front: He
Removed a Tariff, WASH. POST (May 17, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
trump-delays-auto-tariff-threat-for-up-to-180-days/2019/05/17/95432e8e-78a7-11e9-b7ae-390de4259661_
story.html.
6 Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico Becomes First Country to Ratify New North American Trade Deal, WASH. POST
(June 19, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexico-becomes-first-country-to-
ratify-usmca-north-american-trade-deal/2019/06/19/500dd8c0-92b3-11e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html
(noting the Mexican Senate’s overwhelmingly supportive vote of 114 to 4).
7 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 114 AJIL 137, 141 (2020) (citing Speaker of the
House Press Release, Transcript of Speaker Pelosi Press Conference Announcing New USMCA Agreement (Dec.
10, 2019), at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/121019-2). Canada and Mexico signed a revised version of the
USMCA that incorporated these changes. Id.
8 Anthony Esposito & Peter Cooney,Mexican Senate Approves Changes to USMCA Regional Trade Deal, REUTERS
(Dec. 12, 2019), at https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-usmca/mexican-senate-approves-changes-to-
usmca-regional-trade-deal-idUSL1N28N00V.
9 165 Cong. Rec. H12284-85 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2019) (recording a vote of 385–41); 166 Cong. Rec. S266
(daily ed. Jan. 16, 2020) (recording a vote of 89–10); Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Signing the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 45 (Jan. 29).
10 David Ljunggren,Canadian Parliament Rushes Through Ratification of USMCATrade Pact, REUTERS (Mar. 13,
2020), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-usmca-canada/canadian-parliament-rushes-through-
ratification-of-usmca-trade-pact-idUSKBN2102I5.
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protocol.11 Pursuant to this protocol, the USMCA entered into force on July 1, 2020, on the
“first day of the third month following the last notification.”12 This entry into force had the
effect of “supersed[ing] the NAFTA, without prejudice to those provisions set forth in the
USMCA that refer to provisions of the NAFTA,” and of terminating the 1993 North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.13
The USMCA’s entry into force occurred amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Travel across both
the U.S.-Mexico and the U.S.-Canada border has been limited since March 21, 2020,
although these limits on “non-essential” travel are not aimed at critical goods or supply
chains.14 It remains to be seen whether or how the entry into force of the USMCA will affect
the economic situation of the three countries amid the pandemic.15 On July 8, 2020, Trump
and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador released a joint statement highlight-
ing the USMCA’s role as an “ideal instrument to provide economic certainty and increased
confidence to our countries, which will be critical to the recovery that has begun in both of
our nations.”16
11 Protocol Replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement with the Agreement Between the United
States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/
agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/USMCA_Protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU6W-PWXM] [hereinafter
Protocol]; Janyce McGregor, Canada Notifies U.S. and Mexico It Has Ratified Revised NAFTA, CBC NEWS
(Apr. 3, 2020), at https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-cusma-canada-ratified-1.5520337 (reporting Canada
to be the first country to give the notification); Office of U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, USMCA to Enter into
Force July 1 After United States Takes Final Procedural Steps for Implementation (Apr. 24, 2020), at https://
ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2020/april/usmca-enter-force-july-1-after-united-
states-takes-final-procedural-steps-implementation (describing the United States as the third country to provide
its notification).
12 Protocol, supra note 11.
13 Id.
14 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security Press Release, Fact Sheet: DHS Measures on the Border to Limit the
Further Spread of Coronavirus (Aug. 14, 2020), at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/08/14/fact-sheet-dhs-mea-
sures-border-limit-further-spread-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/8FV4-REA7] (noting that these restrictions were
initially set for thirty days but have since been continuously extended through September 31); U.S. Customs and
Border Prot. Press Release, Temporary Restriction of Travelers Crossing US-Canada andMexico Land Borders for
Non-essential Purposes (Aug. 18, 2020), at https://help.cbp.gov/s/article/Article-1596?language¼en_US (noting
that “[s]upply chains, including trucking, will not be impacted”). Citing the pandemic, the United States has
placed major new restrictions on asylum seekers crossing the border. See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary
Practice of the United States, 114 AJIL 504, 510–11 (2020).
15 SeeDavid A. Wemer, Start of USMCA Brings Hope Amid COVID-19 Economic Crisis, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (July
1, 2020), at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/start-of-usmca-brings-hope-amid-covid-19-
economic-crisis (providing commentary on the USMCA’s impact on the American economy during the
pandemic); Meena Venkataramanan & Julián Aguilar, Trump Called the USMCA the Best Trade Deal Ever.
Analysts Say It’s Not Likely to Help Texas During The Pandemic, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2020), at https://www.tex-
astribune.org/2020/08/12/usmca-trade-agreement-coronavirus-texas-mexico (“But several months into a
COVID-19 pandemic that continues to ravage the global economy, analysts say there isn’t anything in the
USMCA that’s going to make an immediate difference and help offset the massive economic losses caused by
the pandemic.”). In addition to the ongoing pandemic, some issues that remain in the implementation of the
USMCA include “hundreds of legal challenges to Mexico’s new labor law championed by President Andrés
Manuel López Obrador to ensure that workers can freely organize and unions are granted full collective bargaining
rights.”David Lawder, DaveGraham&David Ljunggren,NewNorth American Trade Deal Launches Under Cloud
of Disputes, Coronavirus, REUTERS (June 30, 2020), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-usmca/new-
north-american-trade-deal-launches-under-cloud-of-disputes-coronavirus-idUSKBN2424E2. If the new labor
laws are struck down, Mexico might not be able to implement labor-related provisions in the USMCA, prompting
U.S. Representative Richard Neal, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to accuse Mexico of
“falling short of its commitments.” Id.
16 Joint Declaration by President Trump and President Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico, 2020 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 502 (July 8).
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On August 6, Trump reimposed a 10 percent tariff on certain aluminum products
imported from Canada.17 Trump stated that the 2019 understanding reached with
Canada lifting the prior tariffs had sought to “avoid import surges” but that, in the year imme-
diately following this agreement, imports on these aluminum products “increased 87 percent
compared to the prior twelve-month period and exceeded the volume of any full calendar year
in the previous decade.”18 Canada’s Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland responded by
describing these tariffs as “unwarranted and unacceptable,” noting that “[i]n the time of a
global pandemic and an economic crisis, the last thing Canadian and American workers
need is new tariffs.”19 She stated that “with the new NAFTA having come into force on
July 1st, now is the time to advance North American economic competitiveness—not hinder
it,” and promised that Canada would “swiftly impose dollar-for-dollar countermeasures.”20
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
President Trump Authorizes Economic Sanctions and Visa Restrictions Aimed at International
Criminal Court
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.77
In the spring of 2020, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
authorized the ICC’s prosecutor to investigate alleged international crimes committed in
Afghanistan. The Trump administration strongly condemned this decision. In an escalation
of retaliatory measures against the ICC, President Trump signed an executive order autho-
rizing economic sanctions against foreign persons involved in the investigation and visa
restrictions against those persons and their immediate family members. The ICC described
these actions as a threat to the rule of law.
On April 12, 2019, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC declined to authorize the prosecutor
to conduct an investigation into alleged international crimes committed in Afghanistan, rea-
soning that such an investigation would not advance the interests of justice.1 On March 5,
17 Donald J. Trump, Proclamation 10060—Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States, 2020
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 578 (Aug. 6) [hereinafter Proclamation on Aluminum Tariffs] (providing for
this tariff, effective August 16, on non-alloyed unwrought aluminum articles, which “accounted for 59 percent
of total aluminum imports from Canada during June 2019 through May 2020”).
18 Id., paras. 3, 6; but see Amanda Coletta & Jeanne Whalen, Canada Condemns “Entirely Unacceptable” U.S.
Tariffs, Pledges to Retaliate with Levies on $2.7 Billion of Goods, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2020), at https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canada-us-trade-trump-aluminum-tariffs/2020/08/07/793f30ba-d8b0-
11ea-a788-2ce86ce81129_story.html (noting that the U.S. Aluminum Association described these numbers as
“‘cherry-picked’” as “any increase in imports of non-alloyed aluminum in the first half of 2020 have been offset
by a decline in imports of alloyed aluminum, and . . . overall, imports of primary aluminum from Canada are ‘near
traditional levels’”).
19 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister of Canada Press Release, Statement by the Deputy Prime Minister on
US Tariffs on Imports of Canadian Aluminum (Aug. 6, 2020), at https://deputypm.canada.ca/en/news/state-
ments/2020/08/06/statement-deputy-prime-minister-us-tariffs-imports-canadian-aluminum.
20 Id.; see also Coletta &Whalen, supra note 18 (describing the tariffs that Canada announced it would impose
in response).
1 See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-138, Judgment on the Appeal Against the
Decision on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, para. 5
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2020, the ICC Appeals Chamber reversed, holding that the Pre-Trial Chamber erred in
declining to authorize the investigation.2 The Appeals Chamber directly authorized the pros-
ecutor to begin investigations into “‘alleged crimes committed on the territory of
Afghanistan . . . since 1 May 2003, [and] other alleged crimes that have a nexus to the
armed conflict in Afghanistan and are sufficiently linked to the situation and were committed
on the territory of other States Parties . . . since 1 July 2002.’”3 This authorization permits the
prosecutor to investigate members of the U.S. armed forces and the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency for alleged crimes committed not only in Afghanistan, but also for alleged related
crimes committed in detention centers in Poland, Romania, and Lithuania.4
Even before the Appeals Chamber’s decision, the Trump administration had strongly
resisted the prospect of an ICC investigation regarding Afghanistan that could encompass
alleged crimes committed by U.S. citizens.5 In April 2019, the United States revoked ICC
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s visa because her request for authorization of an investigation
into Afghanistan had described members of the U.S. armed forces and the Central
Intelligence Agency as potential perpetrators of war crimes.6 When the Pre-Trial Chamber
denied the prosecutor’s request in April of 2019, Trump praised the decision as a “major
international victory . . . for the rule of law,” but also warned that “[a]ny attempt to target
American, Israeli, or allied personnel for prosecution will be met with a swift and vigorous
response.”7
In the months following the decision of the Appeals Chamber, Trump administration offi-
cials reacted angrily to the prospect of U.S. personnel being investigated by the ICC. Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo asserted that “we will not stand by as our people are threatened by a
kangaroo court.”8 He also accused the ICC of being “grossly ineffective and corrupt,” stating
that the ICC has operated for eighteen years and secured only four convictions.9 Secretary of
Defense Mark Esper praised U.S. military personnel and asserted that the United States
(Mar. 5, 2020), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00828.PDF [https://perma.cc/
L7PZ-V3CT] (describing the Pre-Trial Chamber’s opinion).
2 Id., paras. 19–46 (finding it was error for the Pre-Trial Chamber to deny the prosecutor’s request on the basis
that “an investigation would not serve the interests of justice”).
3 Id., para. 79.
4 See id., paras. 65–78; see also Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp,
Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, para. 49 (Nov. 20, 2017), available at
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/db23eb/pdf (identifying Poland, Romania, and Lithuania as countries where
the CIA operated clandestine sites and subjected militants to acts constituting crimes over which the ICC has
jurisdiction).
5 See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 169 (2019) (discussing a 2018
speech by John Bolton, then the U.S. National Security Advisor, criticizing the ICC for attempting to investigate
U.S. involvement in Afghanistan).
6 See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 625 (2019).
7 Donald J. Trump, Statement on the International Criminal Court’s Decision Not to Authorize an
Investigation into the Situation in Afghanistan, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 224 (Apr. 12).
8 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability with Secretary of
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maintains the right to try its own citizens and that they will never “be subjected to the judg-
ments of unaccountable international bodies.”10
On June 11, 2020, Trump issued an executive order declaring a national emergency with
respect to the ICC’s actions and authorizing economic sanctions and visa restrictions against
those involved in conducting investigations against U.S. personnel or against the personnel of
a U.S. ally without that ally’s consent.11 The Executive Order authorizes economic sanctions
against “any foreign person determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General:”
(A) to have directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or
prosecute any United States personnel without the consent of the United States;
(B) to have directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain, or pros-
ecute any personnel of a country that is an ally of the United States without the consent of
that country’s government;
(C) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technolog-
ical support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any activity described in subsec-
tion (a)(i)(A) or (a)(i)(B) of this section or any person whose property and interests in
property are blocked pursuant to this order; or
(D) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to this order.12
Additionally, those persons who fit the above criteria and their immediate family members
could also be denied “unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United
States.”13
10 Id.
11 Exec. Order No. 13,928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139 (June 11, 2020); see also Uzay Yasar Aysev, Can the
International Criminal Court Hold the Trump Administration in Contempt?, JUST SECURITY (June 30, 2020), at
https://www.justsecurity.org/71498/can-the-international-criminal-court-hold-the-trump-administration-in-
contempt (noting that the reference to U.S. allies is probably meant to refer to Israel, given the ICC investigation
into the situation in Palestine). Although Trump authorized sanctions, the executive branch did not immediately
specify any persons to whom these sanctions would apply in practice. See Rob Berschinski, Trump’s ICC EOWill
Undercut All U.S. Sanctions Programs—Is that Why Treasury Isn’t Conspicuously on Board?, JUST SECURITY (June 16,
2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/70796/trumps-icc-eo-will-undercut-all-u-s-sanctions-programs-is-that-
why-treasury-isnt-conspicuously-on-board. On September 2, Trump administration officials announced the
imposition of certain sanctions—most notably on Bensouda and on Phakiso Mochochoko, the Director of the
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division within the Office of the Prosecutor. Haley S. Anderson,
Why Them? On the U.S. Sanctions Against Int’l Crim. Court Officials, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 2, 2020), at https://
www.justsecurity.org/72275/why-them-on-the-u-s-sanctions-against-intl-criminal-court-officials.
12 Exec. Order No. 13,928, supra note 11. The Executive Order also bans donations and contributions of
funds, goods, or services to these individuals. Id.; see also David Scheffer, The Self-Defeating Executive Order
Against the International Criminal Court, JUST SECURITY (June 12, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/
70742/the-self-defeating-executive-order-against-the-international-criminal-court (considering that the sanctions
are so sweeping that even lawyers who file amicus briefs could be targeted).
13 Exec. Order No. 13,928, supra note 11 (also authorizing the secretary of state to restrict entry of agents of the
ICC into the United States if he or she determines this entry to be “detrimental to the interests of the United
States”).
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Trump invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in his autho-
rization of economic sanctions.14 The IEEPA empowers the president to regulate the use of any
property within U.S. jurisdiction “in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest,”15 but only when the president does so to address “an unusual and extraordinary threat
with respect to which a national emergency has been declared.”16 When the IEEPA was first
enacted in 1977, presidents largely targeted foreign governments and geographical regions.17
Since then, presidents have increasingly targeted “groups and individual persons . . . engaged in
specific activities.”18 This Executive Order is the first such order invoking the IEEPA to target
individuals for their participation in an international organization.19
In response, the ICC issued a statement “express[ing] profound regret at the announce-
ment of further threats and coercive actions . . . against the Court and its officials.”20 The
statement continued:
These are the latest in a series of unprecedented attacks on the ICC, an independent
international judicial institution, as well as on the Rome Statute system of international
criminal justice, which reflects the commitment and cooperation of the ICC’s 123 State
Parties, representing all regions of the world.
These attacks constitute an escalation and an unacceptable attempt to interfere with the
rule of law and the Court’s judicial proceedings. They are announced with the declared
aim of influencing the actions of ICC officials in the context of the Court’s independent
and objective investigations and impartial judicial proceedings.
An attack on the ICC also represents an attack against the interests of victims of atrocity
crimes, for many of whom the Court represents the last hope for justice.21
On the day before the Executive Order issued, ten states parties to the Rome Statute who are
presently members of the UN Security Council issued a joint statement reiterating their com-
mitment to the ICC and to preserving its independence.22
14 See id.
15 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
16 Id. § 1701(b).
17 CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, IAN F. FERGUSSON, DIANNE E. RENNACK & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 22
(2020), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ27-SRM6].
18 Id. at 23.
19 See id. at 16, fig. 1 (documenting every executive order invoking the IEEPA since its enactment).
20 Int’l Criminal Court Press Release, Statement of the International Criminal Court on Recent Measures
Announced by the US (June 11, 2020), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name¼200611-icc-
statement.
21 Id.; see also Int’l Criminal Court Press Release, ASP President O-Gon Kwon Rejects Measures Taken Against
ICC (June 11, 2020), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name¼pr1527 [https://perma.cc/PVS2-8FJD]
(“deeply regret[ting]” the U.S. actions).
22 United Nations, International Criminal Court Members of the Council on the ICC and Sudan – Virtual Media
Stakeout, YOUTUBE (June 10, 2020), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼FVEKk1hcRhA. The executive
order also drew sharp criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, I Help Children in Armed
Conflict. The President Is Forcing Me to Stop, JUST SECURITY (June 29, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/
71048/i-help-children-in-armed-conflict-the-president-is-forcing-me-to-stop; Scheffer, supra note 12 (criticizing
the U.S. justification for sanctions as “hyperbolically-charged words of scant truth or meaning”); Berschinski,
supra note 11 (arguing that the executive order will “delegitimize[e]” U.S. sanctions programs).
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USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
United States Gives Notice of Withdrawal from Treaty on Open Skies
doi:10.1017/ajil.2020.73
OnMay 21, 2020, U.S. Secretary of StateMike Pompeo announced that the United States
would withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. The treaty, which has been ratified by sev-
eral former Soviet Republics and most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mem-
bers, allows states parties to conduct observation flights over each other’s territory to build
trust and transparency with respect to arms control. The treaty gives state parties a right to
withdraw upon six months of notice, which Pompeo stated would be formally given by the
United States on May 22. Pompeo described the U.S. withdrawal as a response to Russian
violations of the treaty and held open the possibility that the United States would rescind its
notice of withdrawal in the event of full Russian compliance. U.S. allies in Europe reaffirmed
their own commitment to the treaty and to working with Russia over disputes arising from it.
The announced U.S. withdrawal raises significant issues of U.S. domestic law, as the Trump
administration did not comply with preconditions to withdrawal that had been established by
Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.
The impetus behind the Treaty on Open Skies, commonly known as the Open Skies
Treaty, originated with President Eisenhower.1 His proposal sought to ease tensions between
the United States and the Soviet Union by allowing the two countries to conduct observation
flights over each other’s territories, thus minimizing the opportunity for either country to
launch surprise military attacks against the other.2 The Soviet Union rejected Eisenhower’s
proposal, but President George H.W. Bush successfully restarted negotiations in 1989.3 The
Open Skies Treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002, almost a decade after the United
States, Russia, and twenty-two other countries signed it onMarch 24, 1992.4 The treaty aims
to “improve openness and transparency, to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with exist-
ing or future arms control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention
and crisis management.”5 Under the Open Skies Treaty, parties can conduct a predetermined
number of observation flights over other parties’ territories, and they must also accept a cer-
tain number of flights from other parties.6 Each party has a right to withdraw from the treaty,
1 David E. Sanger, Trump Will Withdraw from Open Skies Arms Control Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2020), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/us/politics/trump-open-skies-treaty-arms-control.html; AP Archive, Ike
States Policy on Spies and Open Skies, YOUTUBE (July 31, 2015), at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v¼4DH3c9WJMQU.
2 Sanger, supra note 1.
3 AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10502, THE OPEN SKIES TREATY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1
(2020), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IN10502.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ78-JGPB].
4 Id. The Open Skies Treaty currently has thirty-four states parties. Glob. Aff. Can., Depository Status for the
Treaty on Open Skies, at https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/details.aspx?id¼102747 [hereinafter Depository Status
for the Treaty on Open Skies]. All NATO members are party to the treaty except for Albania, Montenegro, and
North Macedonia, as are several former Soviet Republics and several other European states. See id.; NATO,
Member Countries (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm.
5 Treaty on Open Skies, pmbl., para. 6, Mar. 24, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-37 (1993).
6 Id. Art. 3, § 1, paras. 1–2. Observation flights conducted under the Open Skies Treaty are heavily regulated.
See, e.g., id.Art. 4 (stipulating the types of sensors allowable for observation aircrafts and the performance limits for
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but it must “provide notice of its decision to withdraw to either Depositary at least six months
in advance of the date of its intended withdrawal and to all other States Parties.”7
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced on May 21, 2020, that the United States
would withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, remarking that a formal notice of withdrawal
would be submitted the following day.8 Pompeo stated in part:
While the United States along with our Allies and partners that are State Parties to the
Treaty have lived up to our commitments and obligations under the Treaty, Russia has
flagrantly and continually violated the Treaty in various ways for years. This is not a story
exclusive to just the Treaty on Open Skies, unfortunately, for Russia has been a serial
violator of many of its arms control obligations and commitments. Despite the Open
Skies Treaty’s aspirations to build confidence and trust by demonstrating through unre-
stricted overflights that no party has anything to hide, Russia has consistently acted as if it
were free to turn its obligations off and on at will, unlawfully denying or restricting Open
Skies observation flights whenever it desires.
Russia has refused access to observation flights within a 10-kilometer corridor along its
border with the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
thereby attempting to advance false Russian claims that these occupied territories are
independent states. Russia’s designation of an Open Skies refueling airfield in Crimea,
Ukraine, is similarly an attempt to advance its claim of purported annexation of the pen-
insula, which the United States does not and will never accept. Russia has also illegally
placed a restriction on flight distance over Kaliningrad, despite the fact that this enclave
has become the location of a significant military build-up that Russian officials have sug-
gested includes short-range nuclear-tipped missiles targeting NATO. In 2019, Russia
unjustifiably denied a shared United States and Canada observation flight over a large
Russian military exercise.9
such sensors); id. Art. 6 (detailing the way in which observation flights are to be conducted); id. Art. 9 (regulating
the handling of data collected from sensors).
7 Id. Art. 15.2. The depositaries for the Open Skies Treaty are Canada and Hungary. Id. Art. 17.1. Once the
depositaries receive a notice of withdrawal, they must notify other states parties and convene a conference among
all state parties between thirty and sixty days after receipt of the notice. Id. Art. 15.3.
8 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On the Treaty on Open Skies (May 21,
2020), at https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies [https://perma.cc/7B7D-S5JK] [hereinafter Treaty
Withdrawal Announcement]. As of August 17, 2020, Canada has not updated its depository status web page to
reflect having received a U.S. communication regarding withdrawal. Depository Status for the Treaty on Open
Skies, supra note 4. Pompeo’s announcement came after many signals from the Trump administration—going
back at least to the fall of 2019—that withdrawal was under consideration. See, e.g., U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Foreign Affairs Press Release, Engel Denounces Trump Administration Potential
Plans to Withdraw from Open Skies Treaty (Oct. 7, 2019), at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2019/10/engel-
denounces-trump-administration-potential-plans-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty [https://perma.cc/X6ST-
BGYT].
9 Treaty Withdrawal Announcement, supra note 8 (also referring briefly to earlier violations). As part of a sep-
arate briefing, U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher A. Ford listed
various Russian violations of theOpen Skies Treaty that had occurred at earlier points of time, going back to 2005.
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Briefing with Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control Marshall Billingslea
and Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Dr. Christopher A. Ford on the Treaty on
Open Skies (May 21, 2020), at https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-
marshall-billingslea-and-assistant-secretary-for-international-security-and-nonproliferation-dr-christopher-a-
ford-on-the-treaty-on-ope [https://perma.cc/C4WF-5RMU]. The United States had responded to certain
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Pompeo also asserted that Russia has “weaponized the Treaty bymaking it into a tool of intim-
idation and threat,” alleging that Russia had been undertaking observation flights to map out
areas in the United States and Europe for targeting in potential military campaigns.10 Noting
that U.S. allies “still find value in the Treaty,” he rejected remaining in the treaty “in order to
maintain an empty façade of cooperation with Moscow.”11
Pompeo expressly mentioned the possibility that the United States might change course
and remain in the Open Skies Treaty, should Russia “demonstrate[] a return to full compli-
ance with this confidence-building Treaty.”12 In a brief exchange with reporters that same
day, President Trump similarly observed that “until they adhere, we will pull out” but that
“there’s a very good chance we’ll make a new agreement or do something to put that agree-
ment back together.”13 Nonetheless, White House aides have indicated that the United
States is unlikely to reconsider its planned withdrawal.14
After Pompeo’s announcement, twelve European countries issued a joint statement
expressing regret over the U.S. decision.15 The countries acknowledged sharing U.S. “con-
cerns about implementation of the Treaty clauses by Russia,” but reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the Open Skies Treaty as “functioning and useful.”16 NATO Secretary General Jens
Stoltenberg issued a statement observing that the United States had left the door open to
revisiting its decision and that “NATO Allies and partner nations have engaged with
Russia . . . to seek Russia’s return to compliance at the earliest date possible.”17 German
Russian restrictions on overflights in the past by imposing its own restrictions on overflights conducted over
Hawaii and prohibiting flights over two U.S. Air Force bases. WOOLF, supra note 3, at 2. In response to
Pompeo’s accusations, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release describing several U.S. vio-
lations of the Open Skies Treaty. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fed’n Press Release, Treaty on Open
Skies: Questions and Answers (May 26, 2020), at https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/
regprla/-/asset_publisher/YCxLFJnKuD1W/content/id/4138584 [https://perma.cc/GY43-A3MR].
10 See Treaty Withdrawal Announcement, supra note 8; but see Justin Key Canfil, The U.S. Will Exit the Open
Skies Treaty and It’s Unclear Why, LAWFARE (June 3, 2020), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-will-exit-open-
skies-treaty-and-its-unclear-why (noting that, on this issue, “detailed allegations are scant, at least at the open-
source level” and that in any event the treaty does not prohibit such use of observational information).
11 Treaty Withdrawal Announcement, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Prior to Departure for Ypsilanti, Michigan, 2020 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 387, at 1 (May 21).
14 Sanger, supra note 1. This may be particularly true given that the U.S. announcement of withdrawal occurred
despite several conciliatory signals sent by Russia in the spring of 2020. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release,
James Gilmore, U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Briefing with U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE James Gilmore
(Mar. 2, 2020), at https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-u-s-ambassador-to-the-osce-james-gilmore (noting that
Russia had recently allowed an overflight “near Kaliningrad, which has always been somewhat of a sticking
point” and that Russia had stated that it would roll back its “reluctance to let us fly over one of their major exer-
cises”). Moreover, several of the ongoing violations described by Pompeo relate to disputes that go beyond the
Open Skies Treaty, such as the status of Crimea.
15 Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs Press Release, Statement of the Foreign Ministries of France,
Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and





17 NATO Press Release, Jens Stoltenberg, Sec’y Gen. of the N. Atl. Treaty Org., Statement by the NATO
Secretary General on the Open Skies Treaty (May 22, 2020), at https://nato.cmail19.com/t/ViewEmail/r/
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Foreign Minister Heiko Maas issued a separate statement criticizing the U.S. decision and
urging the United States to reconsider.18 Maas stated that the concerns raised about
Russian compliance do not warrant U.S. withdrawal, a view he and the foreign ministers
of “France, Poland and the UK have repeatedly informed US Secretary of State
Pompeo.”19 The Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs denied U.S. allegations that
Russia had violated the Treaty and characterized the dispute as stemming from the Trump
administration’s misrepresentation of “technical issues” as treaty violations.20
On July 6, 2020, a Conference of the Parties met virtually for “extensive discussions, which
offered a broad range of views” related to the effects of a U.S. withdrawal.21 This gathering
was convened by Canada and Hungary, the depositories for the Open Skies Treaty, who have
a joint obligation under the treaty to convene such a conference between thirty and sixty days
of receiving a notice of withdrawal.22
In addition to prompting international debate, the Trump administration’s decision to
give notice of withdrawal presents significant issues as a matter of U.S. domestic law. The
United States joined the Open Skies Treaty pursuant to the process set forth in Article II
of the U.S. Constitution, with the Senate advising and consenting in 1993 to U.S. participa-
tion in the treaty.23 It has become “established practice” that presidents may unilaterally with-
draw the United States from Article II treaties, provided the withdrawal is consistent with
international law.24 But historical practice “does not establish that this [unilateral power]
is an exclusive presidential power,” and withdrawal could “possibly [be limited] by
Congress through statute.”25
In 2019, Congress passed a statutory provision that requires the executive branch to notify
Congress at least 120 days before submitting a formal notice of withdrawal from the Open
Skies Treaty. Section 1234 of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 states:
(a) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days before the provision of
notice of intent to withdraw the United States from the Open Skies Treaty to either
treaty depository pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees, the
2033286A5B1B26532540EF23F30FEDED/726C13780B153887419C69E1CEBE89F9 [https://perma.cc/
9N5Z-8PNS].
18 Federal Foreign Office Press Release, Foreign Minister Maas on America’s Announcement that It Intends to
Withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (May 21, 2020), at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/
maas-open-skies/2343744 [https://perma.cc/T6UJ-ME22].
19 Id.
20 Russia Calls U.S. Leaving Open Skies Treaty a “Blow” to European Security, MOSCOWTIMES (May 22, 2020), at
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/05/21/russia-calls-us-leaving-open-skies-treaty-a-blow-to-european-
security-a70345.
21 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Press Release, Conference of State Parties to the Open
Skies Treaty Discusses U.S. Intent to Withdraw from the Treaty (July 7, 2020), at https://www.osce.org/oscc/
456646.
22 Id.; see also Treaty on Open Skies, supra note 5, Art. 15.3.
23 See U.S. CONST. Art. II § 2; 139 Cong. Rec. 19913 (1993) (documenting the Senate’s resolution of advice
and consent).
24 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313.1 (2018).
25 Id. § 313 Reporters’ Note 6 (noting that such a limitation could occur if the power to withdraw the United
States from treaties is shared between Congress and the president rather than exclusive to the president).
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Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate a notification that—
(1) such withdrawal is in the best interests of the United States national security; and
(2) the other state parties to the Treaty have been consulted with respect to such
withdrawal.26
Prior to the enactment of this statutory provision, and also in a presidential signing statement,
the Trump administration signaled that it would not view this provision as a constitutional
limit on presidential power.27
The Trump administration did not provide Congress with notification pursuant to Section
1234(a) before giving notice of the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty.28 It thus
ignored the additional four-month period that the statute sought to embed into the with-
drawal process—and, in the process, the administration ensured that withdrawal would be
complete before the start of the next U.S. presidential term in January of 2021. In a letter
to Pompeo on May 28, 2020, the House Foreign Affairs Committee “strongly condemn[ed]
the Administration’s decision to submit the notice of intent to withdraw from the Open Skies
Treaty” and objected to its “violation of the law under section 1234 of the Fiscal Year 2020
National Defense Authorization Act.”29 The letter observed:
[W]e reject the Administration’s claim that the Constitution entitles the President to vio-
late statutory law by refusing to submit advance notification of this withdrawal to
Congress. The House and Senate rejected this claim of unchecked executive authority
through bipartisan passage of section 1234 . . . . With the passage of this law,
Congress made clear that it would need adequate notice of withdrawal from this long-
standing treaty to effectively carry out its responsibilities under Article I of the
Constitution. The Administration’s lack of transparency with Congress only underscores
26 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1234, 133 Stat. 1198
(2019) [hereinafter 2020 NDAA].
27 Prior to the statute’s enactment, theDepartment of Justice sent a letter stating, with respect to a closely related
provision that did not end up in the final statute, that “[w]e are aware of no legal precedent holding that Congress
may prevent the President from withdrawing the United States from a treaty. We regard the absence of any his-
torical precedent of this nature as significant evidence that Congress may not restrict the President in this manner.”
Letter from Prim F. Escalona, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Adam Smith,
Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Armed Servs. 9 (Nov. 27, 2019) (citations omitted), at https://www.justice.
gov/ola/page/file/1222061/download [https://perma.cc/QH7T-5B4U]. When Trump signed the statute into
law, he asserted in a signing statement that notification provisions like the one in Section 1234(a) “encompass
only actions for which such advance certification or notification is feasible and consistent with the President’s
exclusive constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign
affairs.” Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, 2019 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 880, at 1 (Dec. 20).
28 Letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Foreign Affairs, et al.
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the degree to which the withdrawal decision was poorly considered and detrimental to
our interests.30
It remains to be seen whether this conflict between Congress and the Trump administration
will result in litigation or other further action.31
Aside from the Open Skies Treaty, Trump has already withdrawn the United States from
numerous international commitments, including, with respect to arms control, the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.32
These withdrawals also make it doubtful that the administration will renew the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), a treaty that sets limits on the maximum
number of nuclear arms the United States and Russia can maintain and that expires on
February 5, 2021.33
30 Id. By contrast, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not released a similar statement. Instead, the
Chairman of the Committee announced his support for the withdrawal, while a ranking member of the
Committee denounced the decision as illegal. U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations Press Release,
Chairman Risch Statement on Administration’s Decision to Withdraw from Open Skies Treaty (May 21,
2020), at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-risch-statement-on-administrations-
decision-to-withdraw-from-open-skies-treaty [https://perma.cc/5FKZ-939M]; U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations Press Release, Ranking Member Menendez Statement on Trump Administration’s Withdrawal from
the Open Skies Treaty (May 21, 2020), at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/ranking-
member-menendez_statement-on-trump-administrations-withdrawal-from-the-open-skies-treaty [https://
perma.cc/4T9D-B53K].
31 See Scott R. Anderson & Pranay Vaddi, When Can the President Withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty?,
LAWFARE (Apr. 22, 2020), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/when-can-president-withdraw-open-skies-treaty
(arguing that such litigation would be fraught with justiciability issues and observing that a court might find
on the merits that section 1234 “does not expressly prohibit withdrawal until [the notification] requirement is
fulfilled”).
32 Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 514, 517–18 (2018); Jean Galbraith,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 631, 631 (2019).
33 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 111-5
(2010); AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41219, THE NEW START TREATY: CENTRAL LIMITS AND KEY
PROVISIONS 1 (2020), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VEW-2TL5].
Though the Trump administration has signaled its interest in negotiating with Russia to extend the New
START Treaty, it has demanded that China be included in the negotiations. U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release,
Online Press Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, and
Lieutenant General Thomas A. Bussiere, Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) (June 24, 2020), at https://www.state.gov/online+press+briefing+with+ambassador-marshall-
billingslea-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lieutenant-general-thomas-a-bussiere-deputy-com-
mander-united-states-strategic-command [https://perma.cc/4X4P-45UA].
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